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1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, mainstream macroeconomics is dominated by New Consensus Models (NCMs), 
in particular when it comes to economic policy analysis.1 These models are basically 
characterised by three equations: 1. an aggregate demand function derived from households’ 
and firms’ optimisation behaviour which relates the output gap inversely to the real interest 
rate, 2. an expectations-augmented Phillips curve which makes the rate of inflation positively 
dependent on the output gap in the short run, and 3. a central bank reaction function in which 
the nominal interest rate set by the central bank is determined by the equilibrium real interest 
rate, by the output gap and by the deviation of actual inflation from the inflation target. In 
these models there is again an impact of aggregate demand on output and employment, but 
only in the short run. Due to nominal and real rigidities, for which microfoundations based on 
imperfectly competitive markets are delivered, the short-run Phillips curve is downward 
sloping. In the long run, however, there is no effect of aggregate demand on the ‘Non 
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment’ (NAIRU), which is exclusively determined by 
structural characteristics of the labour market, the wage bargaining institutions and the social 
benefit system.2 Therefore, the long-run Phillips curve becomes vertical. Monetary policy 
applying the interest rate tool is able to stabilise output and employment in the short run, but 
in the long run it is neutral and only affects inflation (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2007). Fiscal 
policy is downgraded and is restricted to support monetary policies in achieving price stability 
(Arestis/Sawyer 2003). 
 
Post-Keynesians (PKs) have criticised these NCMs for a variety of reasons.3 Broadly 
summarised, the critique is related to the assumption of a stable long-run equilibrium NAIRU 
determined exclusively by supply-side factors to which actual unemployment, determined by 
effective demand, can be adjusted by means of monetary policy interventions, on the one 
hand, and to the assumption of the independence of this NAIRU from the development of 
                                                 
1 See Clarida/Gali/Gertler (1999), McCallum (2001), Meyer (2001), Romer (2000), Taylor (2000), and 
Carlin/Soskice (2006: 27-172) for NCMs. 
2 See Ball/Mankiw (2002), Blanchard/Katz (1997), Layard/Nickell/Jackman (1991: 361-396), and Mankiw 
(2001) for concepts of a NAIRU. 
3 For a discussion and a critique of the NCM and its main elements, the NAIRU and an inflation targeting central 
bank, from a PK view see, among others, Angeriz/Arestis (2006), Arestis/Sawyer (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), 
Atesoglu/Smithin (2006), Davidson (2006), Fontana (2006), Fontana/Palacio-Vera (2002, 2004, 2006, 2007), 
Gnos/Rochon (2007), Hein (2002, 2004, 2006a, 2007: 133-152), Kriesler/Lavoie (2007), Lavoie (2004, 2006), 
Monvoisin/Rochon (2006), Palacio-Vera (2005), Palley (2006), Rochon/Rossi (2006), Rochon/Setterfield (2007-
8a, 2007-8b), Sawyer (2001, 2002, 2006), Seccareccia (1998), Setterfield (2004, 2006a, 2006b), Smithin (2004), 
Stockhammer (2004a, 2004b, 2008), and Wray (2007). 
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actual unemployment, and hence from demand and monetary as well as fiscal policies, on the 
other hand. In short, what is questioned is the assumed long-run neutrality of money in the 
NCMs.  
 
Already Sawyer (2001, 2002) argued that the NAIRU should not be considered to be a strong 
attractor for actual unemployment. Stability of the NAIRU has been examined closer by 
Stockhammer (2004a) including the effects of redistribution between profits and wages on 
effective demand which occur when actual unemployment deviates from the NAIRU. Hein 
(2006a, 2007: 133-152) has rather focussed on the effects of redistribution between capitalists 
and rentiers on aggregate demand, triggered by accelerating or decelerating inflation 
associated with a deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU. Both authors conclude that 
the NAIRU is not generally stable, but that a specific demand regime is required for stability. 
Considering the NCM recommendation of inflation targeting monetary policies in order to 
adjust actual unemployment to the NAIRU, Arestis/Sawyer (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), 
Fontana/Palacio-Vera (2007), Hein (2004, 2006a, 2007: 133-152), and Palacio-Vera (2005) 
have argued that monetary policy interventions will not be able to constrain instability in 
many cases for several reasons. Finally, long-run endogeneity of the NAIRU with respect to 
actual unemployment, and hence to macroeconomic and monetary policies, has been related 
to different channels. New Keynesian authors had already pointed to labour market hysteresis 
(Blanchard/Summers 1987, 1988, Ball 1999). PKs have added further channels: capital stock 
and productivity growth effects of investment (Rowthorn 1995, 1999, Sawyer 2001, 2002, 
Arestis/Sawyer 2004a: 73-99, 2005), adaptive wage and profit aspirations 
(Setterfield/Lovejoy 2006, Stockhammer 2008), and distribution effects of interest rate 
variations as the monetary policy instrument (Hein 2006a, 2007: 133-152). 
 
Because of the deficiencies and the problems of NCMs, PKs have started to amend these 
models and have proposed alternatives to the NCM. First, the inflation generation and the 
income generation processes have been reformulated. With respect to the inflation generation 
process, some PK authors have assumed the existence of a short-run inflation barrier and 
hence the NAIRU away (Atesoglu/Smithin 2006, Setterfield 2004, 2006a, 2006b), whereas 
others have accepted that there is such a short-run inflation barrier, which, however, is 
endogenous in the medium to long run through different channels (Lavoie 2004, 2006, Hein 
2006a, 2007: 133-152, Stockhammer 2008). With respect to the income generation process, 
some authors have accepted the interest rate inverse IS-curve from the NCM 
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(Atesoglu/Smithin 2006, Lavoie 2004, 2006, Rochon/Setterfield 2007-8a, Setterfield 2004, 
2006a), whereas others have replaced it by a more elaborated PK/Kaleckian approach to 
effective demand allowing for real debt and different distribution effects (Hein 2006a, 2007: 
133-152, Rochon/Setterfield 2007-8b, Setterfield 2006b, Stockhammer 2008).  
 
Second, different economic policy conclusions, in particular with respect to monetary 
policies, have been drawn. Whereas some authors have argued that central banks’ inflation 
targeting is generally compatible with PK analysis (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2006, 2007, Palley 
2006, Setterfield 2006a), but have demanded a higher emphasis on real stabilisation and more 
adequate inflation targets, others have rejected any fine tuning by means of interest rate 
policies and have rather been in favour of stabilising the interest rate at some growth and 
employment conducive level (Gnos/Rochon 2007, Lavoie 1996a, Smithin 2004, 
Rochon/Setterfield 2007-8a, 2007-8b, Setterfield 2006b, Wray 2007). From this perspective it 
follows that nominal stabilisation should be delegated to wage or incomes policies (Arestis 
1996, Davidson 2006, Hein 2002, 2004, 2006a, 2007: 133-152, Kriesler/Lavoie 2007), and 
that fiscal policies should be in charge of real stabilisation in the short and in the medium to 
long run (Arestis/Sawyer 2003, 2004a, 2004c, Gnos/Rochon 2007). 
 
What is lacking in the PK discussion so far is a basic but general PK synthesis model, which 
allows for a short-run inflation barrier, which captures the major causes for short-run 
instability of the inflation barrier and hence the NAIRU, into which the major channels of 
medium- to long-run endogeneity of the NAIRU can be integrated, and which allows for the 
derivation of a complete PK macroeconomic policy-mix of monetary, fiscal and wage 
policies. Our paper is an attempt to bridge this gap. The paper is organised as follows. In the 
second section we develop a basic PK model. Our model consists of three classes, rentiers, 
firms and workers, and it has a short-run inflation barrier derived from distribution conflict 
between these three classes. Distribution conflict does not only affect inflation but also 
income shares and hence effective demand and employment in a Kaleckian income generation 
process. The stability of the short-run inflation barrier and hence the NAIRU is examined in 
the third section, which also includes the effects of inflation targeting monetary policies, as 
proposed by the NCM and some PKs, as a potential means of adjustment of the actual 
unemployment rate to the NAIRU. The major medium-run endogeneity channels of the 
NAIRU with respect to actual unemployment are introduced in the fourth section: persistence 
mechanisms in the labour market, adaptive wage aspirations, capital stock effects of 
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investment, and distribution effects of interest rate variations. In the fifth section we develop a 
PK macroeconomic policy assignment which allows for improved employment without 
increasing inflation. The sixth section concludes. 
 
2. A basic Post-Keynesian model 
 
2.1 Production, finance, distribution and the inflation generation process 
 
Production, finance and rentiers’ income 
We assume a closed economy with only rudimentary economic activity of the state. There 
will be no taxes and no state employment in the model, but only deficit-financed government 
demand. Under given conditions of production, there is just one type of commodity produced 
with a constant coefficient technology. Assuming away overhead labour, the labour-output-
ratio and hence labour productivity (y) are constant up to full capacity output given by the 
capital stock. The capital-potential output-ratio (v), the relation between the capital stock (K) 
and potential output (Yv), is also constant. The capital stock is assumed not to depreciate. The 
rate of capacity utilisation (z) is given by the relation between actual output and potential 
output. Given these assumption, the supply constraint can be written with the aid of the 
definition of the rate of profit, relating gross capital income (Π) to the capital stock. The rate 
of profit is decomposed into the profit share (h), the rate of capacity utilisation and the inverse 
of the capital-potential output-ratio: 
 
(1) 
v
1hz
K
Y
Y
Y
YK
r
v
v =Π=Π= , 
 
The supply constraint is only reached by accident and the economy usually operates below 
maximum capacity given by the capital stock, i.e. usually: 1z < . 
 
The pace of accumulation is determined by entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest, independently 
of prior savings because firms have access to credit generated by a developed banking sector 
(‘initial finance’). We assume that long-term investment finance (‘final finance’) is supplied 
by firms’ retained earnings or by long-term credit of rentiers’ households (directly or through 
 
 5
banks).4 Introducing interest payments into the model, capital income or gross profits splits 
into (net) profit of enterprise (ΠF) and rentiers’ income (R).  
 
(2) . RF +Π=Π
 
With respect to interest rate and credit, we follow the PK ‘horizontalist’ monetary view 
pioneered by Kaldor (1970, 1982, 1985), Lavoie (1984, 1992: 149-216, 1996b) and Moore 
(1988, 1989) and assume that the interest rate is an exogenous variable for the production and 
accumulation process, whereas the quantities of credit and money are determined 
endogenously by economic activity.5 The central bank controls the base rate of interest, 
commercial banks mark up the base rate and then supply the credit demand they consider 
creditworthy at this interest rate. In what follows we consider just one interest rate as 
representative for the whole structure of interest rates. 
 
Writing in for the nominal rate of interest, we can define the real interest rate for given 
inflation expectations ( ), the ‘ex ante’ real interest rate (ie), as: epˆ
 
(3) . en
e pˆii −=
 
The ‘ex post’ real interest rate, i, becomes endogenous to unexpected inflation ( ): upˆ
 
(4) ( ) ueuen pˆipˆpˆii −=+−= . 
 
Firms’ payments to rentiers are given by the stock of debt (B) at issue prices and the nominal 
rate of interest. Expected rentiers’ interest income (Re) can therefore be decomposed into a 
part compensating for the expected inflationary devaluation of the stock of nominal assets 
held by rentiers ( ), and into expected real net income determined by the ‘ex ante’ real rate 
of interest ( ):6 
Bpˆe
Bie
                                                 
4 The distinction between short-term finance for production purposes (‘initial finance) and long-term finance for 
investment purposes (‘final finance’), not dealt with in the present paper, can be found in the monetary circuit 
approach. See Graziani (1989, 1994), Lavoie (1992: 151-169), Seccareccia (1996, 2003) and Hein (2007: 70-79). 
5 See for a similar procedure with respect to the introduction of monetary variables into PK models of 
distribution and growth Dutt (1989, 1992), Dutt/Amadeo (1993), Hein (2006a, 2006b, 2007: 59-127), Lavoie 
(1992: 347-371, 1993, 1995), and Taylor (1985, 2004: 272-278). 
6 Repayment of debt is not considered explicitly. 
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(5) ( ) BpˆBiBpˆiBiR eeeene +=+== . 
 
Firms’ ‘real’ interest payments and rentiers’ ‘real’ gross income (R) are affected whenever 
unexpected inflation occurs: 
 
(6) ( ) ( )BpˆpˆiBpˆiR ueeun −+=−= . 
 
The debt-capital ratio relates the stock of debt at issue prices to the capital stock at production 
prices and is hence given by: 
 
(7) 
K
B=λ . 
 
Since real debt effects caused by unexpected inflation are delegated to the real income flows, 
the debt-capital-ratio in our definition above can be taken as a constant for the following 
analysis.7  
 
Conflicting claims, employment, unexpected inflation and distribution8 
Unexpected inflation in our model is systematically generated by inconsistent income claims 
of rentiers, firms and workers.9 The target gross profit share of firms ( ), which has to cover 
retained earnings and interest payments to rentiers, is given by mark-up pricing on unit labour 
costs in incompletely competitive goods markets. In the short run, we assume the mark-up to 
be constant up to full capacity output. Changes in the interest rate, which are costs from the 
perspective of the firm, will only have medium to long-run effects on the mark-up, which are 
to be considered below in Section 4. The same is true for persistent changes in the rate of 
capacity utilisation which will also have only medium to long-run effects on firms’ pricing 
and target profit shares. For the short run we assume that neither a change in capacity 
T
Fh
                                                 
7 This means that we will not treat the long-run dynamics of the debt-capital-ratio triggered by changes in the 
interest rate, capital accumulation or distribution. For such an analysis on the basis of the income generation part 
of the present model, albeit without (unexpected) inflation, see Hein (2006b, 2007: 100-127). 
8 This part is developed on the basis of Stockhammer (2008) and extends the model presented there. For PK 
conflicting claims models of inflation see also Arestis/Sawyer (2004a: 73-87, 2005), Hein (2006a, 2007: 133-
152), Lavoie (1992: 391-421, 2002), Rowthorn (1977), and Sawyer (2001, 2002). 
9 Of course, there may also be exogenous shocks generating unexpected inflation. 
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utilisation, nor in the actual or expected real interest rate affects the mark-up. Therefore, the 
firms’ target profit share is simply a constant in the short run: 
 
(8) . 1h0,hh 00
T
F ≤<=
 
If unexpected inflation arises, the realised profit share becomes: 
 
(9) , 1h0,pˆhhh 0
u
20 ≤<−=
 
with h2 denoting the effect of unexpected inflation on the realised profit share.10 The higher h2, 
the less effective are firms in protecting the profit share against unexpected inflation caused 
by external shocks or workers’ wage aspirations. Hence the higher h2, the lower is the 
inflation push originating from firms’ profit aspirations. 
 
The target wage share of workers [ ( )TWTW h1W −= ] depends on the rate of employment (e), 
resp. unemployment (u), because lower unemployment improves workers’ or labour unions’ 
bargaining power. Unemployment has the function to contain distribution claims of labourers 
(Kalecki 1971: 156-164). At this stage, we assume that workers and labour unions do not 
consider the inflationary macroeconomic effects of their nominal wage demands and the 
potentially restrictive monetary policy reactions. There is neither co-ordination between 
unions in different firms or industries, nor between wage bargaining parties and monetary 
policy, with an eye to avoiding macroeconomic externalities of wage bargaining: 
 
(10) . 1010
T
W W0,1W0,eWW)h1( ≤≤<+=−
 
We do not assume full utilisation of productive capacities given by the capital stock to be 
necessarily accompanied by full employment. Therefore, the employment rate is a positive 
function of the rate of capacity utilisation, but these two rates are not necessarily equal: 
 
(11) . 1x0,xze ≤<=
 
                                                 
10 It may appear strange that there is unexpected inflation in Kaleckian framework, where firms actually set 
prices. Indeed, if there were only one firm, it would make no sense. In a more realistic setting, where firms are 
vertically integrated, there may be unexpected inflation in input prices that eat into firms’ mark-up. 
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Whenever there is unexpected inflation, the realised wage share becomes: 
 
(12) , 210
u
210 W,W0,1W0,pˆWeWW)h1( ≤≤<−+=−
 
with W2 denoting the effect of unexpected inflation on the realised wage share. The higher 
W2, the less effective are workers in protecting the wage share against unexpected inflation 
caused by external shocks or firms’ profit aspirations. Hence the higher W2, the lower is the 
inflation push generated by workers’ wage aspirations. 
 
With adaptive expectations ( ), we obtain the following short-run Phillips curve from 
equations (9) and (12): 
1t
e
t pˆpˆ −=
 
(13) 
22
010
1ttt
u
t hW
1heWW
pˆpˆpˆpˆ +
−++=−=∆= − , 
or 
(13a) 
22
010
1tt hW
1heWW
pˆpˆ +
−+++= − . 
 
In our model we have, at each point in time, a short-run inflation barrier which is similar to 
the NAIRU in the NCMs. With consistent income claims ( , we obtain from 
equations (8) and (10) for the stable inflation rate of employment (eN) and the NAIRU uN = 1-
eN: 
1h)h1 TF
T
W =+−
 
(14) 
1
00N
W
hW1e −−= . 
 
Whenever unemployment falls short of the NAIRU, inflation will accelerate because the sum 
of the income claims exceeds output, and unexpected inflation will arise, fuelling future 
inflation expectations. Whenever unemployment exceeds the NAIRU, inflation will 
decelerate. 
 
Figure 1 shows the target wage shares of workers and firms as well as the realised wage share 
as a function of employment in the upper part, and the related unexpected inflation in the 
lower part. 
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< Figure 1: Conflicting claims, inflation and distribution > 
 
Taking into account equation (11) for the relationship between the employment rate and the 
rate of capacity utilisation, we obtain the following stable inflation rate of capacity utilisation 
(zN): 
 
(15) 
1
00
N
N
xW
hW1
x
ez −−== . 
 
2.2 The income generation process11 
 
Economic activity, and hence capacity utilisation and unemployment in our model, is 
determined by effective demand. For the analysis of saving and investment and the related 
goods market equilibrium we also assume that firms, rentiers and labourers form adaptive 
expectations. We assume a classical saving hypothesis, i.e. labourers do not save. The part of 
profits retained is completely saved by definition. The part of profits distributed to rentiers’ 
households, i.e. the interest payments, is used by those households according to their 
propensity to save (sR). Therefore, total saving (S) comprises expected retained profits (Π-inB) 
and saving out of expected interest income (SR). Taking equations (1), (2), (5) and (7) into 
account, we get the private saving rate (σ) which relates total saving to the capital stock: 
 
(16) ( ) 1s0,s1i
v
zh
K
SBi
K
S
RRn
Rn ≤<−λ−=+−Π==σ . 
 
For the accumulation rate (g), relating net investment (I) to the capital stock, we follow the 
arguments in Kalecki (1954) and assume that investment decisions are positively affected 
both by expected sales and by expected retained earnings.12 Expected sales are determined by 
the rate of capacity utilisation. Retained earnings, in relation to the capital stock, are given by 
                                                 
11 The ‘income generation process’ in this paper is based on Hein (2006a, 2006b, 2007: 103-114) and extends the 
models developed there. Rochon/Setterfield (2007-8b), Setterfield (2006b) and Stockhammer (2008) have also 
introduced a more elaborated income generation process than the one in the NCMs. However, they do not take 
fully into account the distribution effects of unexpected inflation and of changes in the interest rate on effective 
demand when deriving the goods market equilibrium. 
12 Whereas expected sales are closely related to profit expectations and therefore affect investment decisions, 
retained earnings are required for long-term investment finance. They also affect the access to external funds on 
imperfect capital markets and therefore investment finance, according to Kalecki’s (1937) ‘principle of 
increasing risk’. 
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the difference between expected profits and expected payments to rentiers normalised by the 
capital stock, and hence by the nominal interest rate and the debt-capital-ratio. Taking into 
account equations (1), (2), (5) and (7) again, we obtain: 
 
(17) 1g,0g,g,g,i
v
zhgzgg
K
I
K
Kg 2210n210 <>

 λ−++==∆= . 
 
We also include deficit financed demand by the government (D) in relation to the capital 
stock (d = D/K). Government demand is exogenous for the purposes of our model: 
 
(18) d
K
Dd == . 
 
The goods market equilibrium is given by: 
 
(19) σ=+ dg , 
 
and the stability condition by: 
 
(20) ( ) 0g
v
hg10
z
d
z
g
z 12
>−−⇒>∂
∂−∂
∂−∂
σ∂ . 
 
From equations (16) – (19), the equilibrium rate of capacity utilisation can be calculated: 
 
(21) ( )( ) 12
02Rne
gg1
v
h
dggs1iz
−−
++−−λ= . 
 
Since equation (21) is based on behavioural equations which by definition can only include 
expected inflation, the ze-equilibrium derived from these equations is an ‘ex ante’ equilibrium. 
Taking into account the relationship between the employment rate and the rate of capacity 
utilisation from equation (11), we obtain the following rate of employment determined by the 
‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium: 
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(22) ( )[ ]( ) 12
02Rne
gg1
v
h
dggs1ixe
−−
++−−λ= . 
 
3. Is the NAIRU a strong attractor in the short run? 
 
The ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium rate of employment in equation (22) may deviate 
from the stable inflation rate of employment determined in equation (14). Such a deviation 
will trigger unexpected inflation which will change distribution between total profits and 
wages, on the one hand, and between retained profits and rentiers’ income, on the other hand. 
The interesting question is now whether unexpected inflation will adjust the goods market 
equilibrium towards the NAIRU. If there is no endogenous convergence towards the NAIRU, 
the next question is then whether an inflation targeting central bank can stabilise the system. 
 
In order to be able to calculate the effects of changes in the inflation rate on the employment 
rate via the channels mentioned above, unexpected inflation and its distribution effects from 
equations (6) and (9) have to be included into the goods market equilibrium (22): 
 
(23) 
( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) 12u20
02R
u
n
gg1pˆhh
v
1
dggs1pˆixe
−−−
++−−λ−= . 
 
Since unexpected inflation causes a deviation from the ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium 
employment rate in equation (22), equation (23) does not define an equilibrium in the 
behavioural sense, with expectations fulfilled. It is rather a temporary ‘ex post’ goods market 
equilibrium caused by unexpected inflation. Since there is no positive or negative excess 
demand in the goods market, economic agents will not change the activity level defined in 
equation (23), but adjust inflation expectations in the next period. However, unless the 
employment rate determined by the ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium matches the stable 
inflation rate of employment, unexpected inflation will occur again, causing once more a 
deviation of the ‘ex post’ from the ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium and so on. 
 
3.1 The NAIRU as a strong short-run attractor without central bank interventions? 
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From equation (23), the effect of unexpected inflation on the goods market equilibrium rate of 
employment can be derived as follows: 
 
(23a) 
( ) ( )
( )( ) 12u20
2R2
2
u
gg1pˆhh
v
1
gs1xeg1
v
h
pˆ
e
−−−
−−λ−−
=∂
∂ . 
 
First, there is redistribution between gross profits and wages affecting the goods market 
equilibrium, with unexpected inflation (disinflation) reducing (raising) the profit share and 
increasing (reducing) the wage share. Through this channel unexpected inflation (disinflation) 
has a positive (negative) effect on economic activity and employment, as can be seen in the 
first term in the numerator. Therefore, our model is unambiguously wage-led, as far as the 
effects of redistribution between capital and labour on capacity utilisation and employment 
are concerned. Taken alone, this causes a further deviation of actual unemployment from the 
NAIRU. 
 
Second, there is redistribution among gross profits, with unexpected inflation (disinflation) 
reducing (raising) the share of rentiers’ income in gross profits. The effect of redistribution 
between firms and rentiers on economic activity through this channel is not clear in advance, 
but depends on the values of the rentiers’ propensity to consume and the elasticity of firms’ 
investment with respect to internal funds. If the former exceeds the latter (1-sR > g2), 
unexpected inflation and redistribution at the expense of rentiers has a dampening effect on 
economic activity (‘puzzling case’). However, if the effect on firms’ investment is stronger 
than the one on rentiers’ consumption (g2 > 1-sR,) unexpected inflation will have a stimulating 
effect on economic activity and capacity utilisation (‘normal case’).13 
 
For the total effect of unexpected inflation on the ‘ex post’ employment rate determined by 
the goods market, we therefore obtain: 
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13 See Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2006b, 2007: 61-127) for a discussion of ‘puzzling’ and ‘normal’ cases in 
Kaleckian distribution and growth models. 
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The requirements for a negative effect of unexpected inflation on the goods market 
equilibrium rate of employment driving it towards the NAIRU are quite restrictive. We do not 
only need the conditions for the ‘puzzling case’ with respect to the macroeconomic effects of 
redistribution between firms and rentiers (1-sR > g2), but also very weak demand effects of 
redistribution between capital and labour caused by unexpected inflation or disinflation. 
 
If the effect of unexpected inflation on the ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium is positive: 
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e
v
h:if,0
pˆ
e −>+−λ>∂
∂ , 
 
unexpected inflation will move the ex post goods market equilibrium farther away from the 
distribution equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 2: The initial ‘ex ante’ goods market 
equilibrium rate of employment (ee1) exceeds the short-run stable inflation rate of 
employment (eN) which triggers unexpected inflation. Since unexpected inflation has a 
positive effect on the ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium rate of employment, this will move 
the goods market equilibrium even farther away from the distribution equilibrium. With 
adaptive expectations economic agents will make the current inflation rate the expected rate in 
the next period, the ‘ex ante’ goods market equilibrium will move to (ee2), and the ‘ex post’ 
goods market equilibrium function in employment-unexpected inflation space will shift 
accordingly. Unexpected inflation will be triggered again and, as a result, the goods market 
equilibrium will diverge monotonically from the stable inflation rate of employment. 
 
< Figure 2: The NAIRU as a non-attractor: monotonic divergence > 
 
A negative relationship between unexpected inflation and the ‘ex post’ goods market 
equilibrium rate of employment as in equation (23a’), however, is only a necessary but not yet 
a sufficient condition for the NAIRU to be a strong attractor. This can be seen in Figures 3 
and 4. 
 
< Figure 3: The NAIRU as an non-attractor: oscillating divergence >  
< Figure 4: The NAIRU as an attractor >  
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In Figure 3 we have a negatively sloped ‘ex post’ goods market equilibrium employment 
curve in employment-unexpected inflation space, but the absolute value of the slope falls 
short of the slope of the short-run Phillips curve, and we obtain diverging oscillations around 
the stable inflation rate of employment – or around the NAIRU. Therefore, the NAIRU is not 
a strong attractor in this case. In Figure 4, however, the absolute value of the slope of the ‘ex 
post’ goods market equilibrium employment curve exceeds the slope of the short-run Phillips 
curve, and the goods market equilibrium rate of employment convergences towards the stable 
inflation rate of employment.14 
 
Therefore, for the NAIRU to be a strong attractor for the actual unemployment rate, the 
following condition derived from equations (13) and (23) has to be valid: 
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To sum up, the stability of the NAIRU requires a very low propensity to save out of rentiers’ 
income, a very low elasticity of investment with respect to internal funds, weak redistribution 
effects of unexpected inflation on labour income and effective demand, and a very flat short-
run Phillips curve. Since there is no economic mechanism in our model which will guarantee 
this very special constellation to hold, we have to discuss the role of the central bank as a 
stabiliser of the NAIRU next. 
 
3.2 An inflation targeting central bank and the NAIRU as a short-run attractor? 
 
Applying the NCM idea of inflation targeting by the central bank, we have to bear in mind 
that the central bank controls the nominal rate of interest in our model. Therefore, this is the 
instrument an inflation targeting central bank can apply in order to achieve some target rate of 
inflation (p ). Here it is sufficient to assume that the central bank’s inflation target equals 
expected inflation ( ) and that the only aim of the central bank is to erase unexpected 
inflation from the system. Therefore, the central bank reaction function becomes: 
Tˆ
eT pˆpˆ =
 
                                                 
14 We may also have converging oscillations which are not shown graphically. 
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with  being the central bank’s estimation of the ‘equilibrium real interest rate’ and i1 the 
reaction parameter with respect to unexpected inflation. From equation (23) we obtain the 
following effect of a change in the nominal interest rate on employment determined by the 
goods market: 
e
0i
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Changing the nominal interest rate will be positively related to capacity utilisation and 
employment, if the ‘puzzling case’ with respect to the demand effects of redistribution 
between firms and rentiers prevails: 
 
(23b’) 2R
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Inflation targeting monetary policy interventions following equation (25) will hence move 
employment farther away from the stable inflation level. Note that the condition in equation 
(23b’), indicating the inappropriateness of inflation targeting monetary policies, is not 
equivalent with the NAIRU being a strong attractor from equation (24). Therefore, if (23b’) is 
valid, but (24) is not, neither is the NAIRU self-stabilising in the face of accelerating 
(decelerating) inflation, nor is monetary policy able to adjust actual unemployment to the 
NAIRU by means of raising (lowering) interest rates. In order to stabilise the NAIRU in this 
case, monetary policies would have to do just the opposite from what is suggested by equation 
(25), namely lowering (raising) the interest rate in the face of accelerating (decelerating) 
inflation. 
 
If the ‘normal case’ with respect to the demand effects of redistribution between firms and 
rentiers prevails, inflation targeting monetary policies will have the required effects on 
economic activity and employment: 
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If unexpected inflation caused by a deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU is not self-
correcting, and the condition in equation (23b’’) is fulfilled, the NAIRU may therefore be 
turned into an attractor by inflation targeting monetary policies following the monetary policy 
rule in equation (25). In this case, the effects of changes in the nominal interest rate have to 
over-compensate the effects of unexpected inflation on capacity utilisation and employment. 
This does not seem to be a problem with unemployment falling short of the NAIRU and 
positive unexpected inflation. The central bank can always increase its instrument variable, 
the nominal interest rate, according to equation (25) and wipe out unexpected inflation by 
means of erasing ‘excess employment’ from the system. This is shown in Figure 5. 
 
< Figure 5: An inflation targeting central bank > 
 
For a stable adjustment it is again required that the absolute value of the slope of the (ex post) 
goods market equilibrium employment curve incorporating monetary policy responses (ecb) 
has to exceed the slope of the short-run Phillips curve in employment-unexpected inflation 
space. Therefore, central banks have to be careful in their responses in order to avoid 
excessive over- and undershooting which would destabilise the system, similar to what is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
There are further limitations for monetary policies adjusting actual employment to the stable 
inflation level, if unemployment exceeds the NAIRU and unexpected inflation is negative, in 
particular in a climate of low inflation and hence low nominal interest rates. With unexpected 
disinflation or even deflation, a negative nominal interest rate according to equation (25) 
might be required in order to stabilise the system, which central banks cannot achieve due to 
the zero lower bound of its instrument variable. Therefore, central banks’ capacities to adjust 
actual unemployment towards the NAIRU may be asymmetric.15 
 
                                                 
15 Another reason for asymmetric effects of central bank policies, not explicitly discussed in our model with only 
one interest rate, arises from the interaction of the central bank with the commercial banking sector. Whereas the 
central bank can always force commercial banks to increase market rates by means of increasing the base rate, 
commercial banks might not follow the central bank decreasing interest rates, in particular in a recession with 
increasing uncertainty and risk assessments. 
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If the central bank considers current inflation expectations determined by past inflation being 
too high and if it sets its target below the currently expected rate (p ), it will have to 
bring down inflation expectations by means of disinflating the economy. This means that the 
central bank has to generate short-run unexpected disinflation by means of reducing 
employment below the stable inflation level, and hence raising unemployment above the 
NAIRU, which will then reduce expected inflation in the next period. However, bringing 
down inflation expectations by means of slowing down the economy contains major risks, 
because the deviation of unemployment from the NAIRU may not be self-correcting.16 
Without immediate central bank counter-action in the opposite direction, therefore, the 
economy may hence suffer from a cumulative slowdown, that is falling employment, 
cumulative disinflation, and finally deflation, which makes central banks powerless, 
according to our arguments above. 
eT pˆˆ <
 
4. Medium-run endogeneity of the NAIRU 
 
In this section we integrate the major medium- to long-run endogeneity channels of the 
NAIRU with respect to actual unemployment into our model. We only indicate the effects on 
the distribution equilibrium and ignore the associated effects on the goods market equilibrium 
rate of employment, which may then give rise to complex interacting dynamics of these two 
equilibria in the long run. The detailed analysis of these interactions is well beyond the scope 
of the present paper.17 Therefore, what follows in this section has a medium-run horizon. We 
start with the channels related to the permanent deviation of actual unemployment from the 
NAIRU (persistence mechanism in the labour market, wage aspirations based on conventional 
behaviour, investment in capital stock) which are due to a failure to adjust actual 
unemployment to the NAIRU in the short run, and then we discuss a channel related to the 
successful adjustment of actual unemployment to the NAIRU by means of monetary policies 
(persistent change in the real interest rate). 
 
4.1 Persistence mechanisms in the labour market 
 
                                                 
16 In the ‚puzzling case’, reducing inflation expectations would require slowing the economy down by means of 
lowering the interest rate. 
17 For an indication of the related dynamics associated with a persistent change in the real interest rate in a 
somewhat simpler model, see Hein (2006a, 2007: 133-152). 
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Labour market related mechanisms for unemployment persistence have already been 
suggested by Blanchard/Summers (1987, 1988) and Ball (1999). Applying union wage 
bargaining or insider-outsider models, persistent unemployment and an increasing share of 
long-term unemployment in total unemployment with the associated loss of skills and access 
to firms by the long-term unemployed will decrease the pressure of a given rate of 
unemployment on labour unions’ or insiders’ target real wage and hence on nominal wage 
demands. This will then require an increasing total rate of unemployment in order to stabilise 
inflation.  
 
Into our model this can be integrated as follows. Assume that the share of the long-term 
unemployed in total unemployment increases when the unemployment rate exceeds some 
threshold, which is given by frictional unemployment caused by the ‘normal’ working of the 
labour market in the face of changing demand patterns and structural as well as regional 
change. The employment rate hence falls short of a ‘full employment’ rate (ef) associated with 
this rate of unemployment. Since the share of long-term unemployment in total 
unemployment will now increase, we obtain the following effect of actual employment on the 
workers’ target wage:  
 
(26) ( )[ ] α≤−α++=− 0,eeeWW)h1( f10TW . 
 
When actual employment persistently falls short of full employment, long-term 
unemployment will arise and the workers’ target wage share for a given total rate of 
employment will increase. Combining equation (26) with firms’ target profit share from 
equation (8) we get for the stable inflation rate of employment and hence for the NAIRU (uN 
= 1-eN): 
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Whenever the employment rate determined by the goods market falls short of the full 
employment rate, it will decrease the stable inflation rate of employment and hence increase 
the NAIRU. 
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Figure 6 shows the negative effect of labour market persistence mechanisms on the stable 
inflation rate of employment, assuming that the initial distribution equilibrium is associated 
with full employment in the above sense. If the goods market equilibrium rate of employment 
persistently falls short of this, the stable inflation rate of employment will decrease below the 
full employment rate.18 
 
< Figure 6: Labour market persistence mechanisms and the NAIRU > 
 
Note that a readjustment of the stable inflation rate of employment to the full employment rate 
requires that the goods market equilibrium rate of employment will have to exceed the stable 
inflation rate for a considerable period of time, facilitating the reintegration of the long-term 
unemployed. 
 
4.2 Wage aspirations based on conventional behaviour  
 
Following an argument suggested by Stockhammer (2008), we now assume that workers’ 
distribution targets are affected by actual distribution. If there is persistent deviation of the 
actual wage share from the target wage share, caused by a deviation of the goods market 
equilibrium rate of employment from the stable inflation rate, wage earners will adjust their 
targets accordingly. Simply put, workers will get used to the actual distribution of income and 
incorporate it into their distribution target. Therefore, in the medium run the target wage share 
from equation (12) becomes: 
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Combining equation (28) with the firms’ target profit share from equation (8), the stable 
inflation rate of employment becomes: 
                                                 
18 Whether the change in the NAIRU associated with labour market persistence mechanisms is temporarily or 
permanent depends on the precise model. Nickell (1998) shows in a standard NAIRU model that labour market-
related persistence mechanisms will only have a permanent effect on the NAIRU if the long term unemployed 
have no effect on wages. 
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A deviation of the actual wage share from the workers’ target share has the following effect 
on the stable inflation rate of employment: 
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A positive deviation of the actual wage share from the workers’ target caused by 
unemployment exceeding the NAIRU finally increases the NAIRU, because workers adjust 
their target share towards the actual share. This is shown in Figure 7. Of course, the process 
also works in the other direction. Unemployment, falling short of the NAIRU, will be 
associated with a wage share below workers’ target and the workers will finally adjust targets 
and hence reduce the NAIRU towards actual unemployment. 
 
< Figure 7: Endogenous wage and profit aspirations and the NAIRU > 
 
4.3 The effect of investment in the capital stock 
 
The effects of investment in the capital stock on employment and the NAIRU have been 
stressed by Rowthorn (1995, 1999), Sawyer (2001, 2002) and Arestis/Sawyer (2004a: 73-99, 
2005).19 In our model, it can be assumed that the relationship between the employment rate 
and the rate of capacity utilisation (x = e/z), taken to be given in the short run, will be 
positively affected by investment in capital stock (g) in the medium run, if labour supply is 
constant or grows with some exogenous rate (n).  
 
(30) 1010 x0,1x0,gxxx ≤≤<+= . 
 
Higher capital stock growth will therefore increase the employment rate associated with the 
stable inflation rate of capacity utilisation in the medium run. 
                                                 
19 For recent empirical work on the effects of capital stock on unemployment see Alexiou/Pitelis (2003), 
Arestis/Baddeley/Sawyer (2006, 2007), Arestis/Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000), Palacio-Vera et al (2006), 
and Stockhammer (2004b). 
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So far, investment in capital stock only relaxes a potential constraint on the stable inflation 
rate of employment given by the capital stock: The faster the growth of productive capacities 
determined by the capital stock growth, the lower the rate of capacity utilisation associated 
with and hence required for a stable inflation rate of employment. However, capital stock in 
relation to output, and hence the medium-run capacity utilisation, may also directly affect the 
stable inflation rate of employment and hence the NAIRU, if firms’ target mark-up is 
positively related to capacity utilisation in the medium run. The lower the growth rate of 
capital stock, the higher will be medium run capacity utilisation, if the exogenous components 
of demand remain constant, and the higher will be the firms’ target profit share: 
 
(32) . 3130
T
F h,h0,zhhh ≤+=
 
Taking also into account equations (10), (11) and (32) we get for the stable inflation rate of 
employment:  
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From this we obtain for the effect of capital accumulation on the stable inflation rate of 
employment: 
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Figure 8 shows this effect associated with weak investment in the short run and therefore low 
capital stock growth in the medium run. 
 
< Figure 8: Low investment, slow capital stock growth and the NAIRU > 
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4.4 Persistent changes in the ‘ex ante’ real rate of interest 
In Section 3 it has been shown that, depending on the model parameters, inflation targeting 
monetary policies may be unnecessary, counterproductive, or limited in their effectiveness in 
the short run. In this section we integrate the medium-run effects of changes in the ‘ex ante’ 
real interest associated with inflation targeting monetary policies. In Hein (2006a, 2007: 133-
152) it has been argued that persistent changes in the ‘ex ante’ real interest rate affect firms’ 
target profit share in the medium to long run and hence the stable inflation rate of 
employment.20 Since interest payments are costs from the perspective of the firm which have 
to be covered by the mark-up on unit labour costs, persistent changes in the ‘ex ante’ real 
interest rate will cause medium-run changes in the firms’ target mark-up. The firms’ target 
profit share from equation (8) has therefore to be expanded with h1 denoting the medium-run 
interest rate elasticity of the target profit share: 
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Note that for a medium-run effect on the target mark-up and the target profit share, it is a 
change in the ‘ex ante’ real interest rate and not in the actual interest payments which is 
relevant, because we assume that firms are well aware of imputed interest costs on own 
capital, i.e. on accumulated retained earnings. Taking into account the workers’ target wage 
share from equation (10), we obtain the following stable inflation rate of employment: 
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A persistent change in the ‘ex ante’ real interest rate will have an inverse effect on the stable 
inflation rate of employment: 
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20 The idea that lasting variations in interest rates may affect functional income distribution and hence the share 
of wages and gross profits in total income goes back to Sraffa (1960: 33) and has been proposed, in particular, by 
Neo-Ricardian authors (see for example Pivetti 1991, 2001), but it can also be found in earlier PK work (Kaldor 
1982: 63, Pasinetti 1974: 139-141). See also Lavoie (1995). This idea is also compatible with Kalecki’s (1954: 
18) notion that the degree of monopoly and hence the mark-up ‘may, but need not necessarily, increase’ when 
overheads and hence interest costs increase. 
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Applying the inflation targeting interest rate rule (equations 25) may therefore stabilise 
inflation in the short run, but in the medium run the effects on the firms’ target profit share 
may undermine the short-run stabilisation effects and may create unexpected inflation again, 
triggering further central bank intervention, as is shown in Figure 9. Note that also this effect 
works in reverse: expansive monetary policies stimulating the economy by means of cutting 
interest rates might trigger accelerating inflation in the short run, but in the medium run lower 
interest costs will reduce firms’ target mark-up and hence the inflationary push. 
 
< Figure 9: Persistent change in the ‘ex ante’ real rate of interest and the NAIRU > 
 
5. A Post-Keynesian macroeconomic policy assignment 
 
From our results so far it follows that the NCM policy assignment has to be completely 
revised in order to achieve a high and stable medium-run employment rate with stable 
inflation expectations. Following our model, we restrict our discussion to a closed economy 
and develop a PK assignment for monetary, wage and fiscal policies without considering open 
economy issues and the exchange rate. 
 
5.1 Monetary policy 
 
From the criticism of inflation targeting monetary policy developed above, different 
implications for more adequate monetary policies can be drawn. Applying the distinction 
made by Rochon/Setterfield (2007-8a, 2007-8b), either an ‘activist’ position or a ‘parking-it’ 
approach for the central bank applying the interest rate has been proposed by PKs. The 
proponents of the ‘activist’ position confirm the central bank’s responsibility for stable 
inflation and regard the interest rate as an appropriate tool to achieve this goal. Therefore, PK 
monetary economics is held to be generally consistent with inflation targeting by central 
banks and with the application of an interest rate operation procedure (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 
2006, 2007, Palley 2006, Setterfield 2006a). Contrary to NCMs, however, they demand more 
careful counter-cyclical stabilisation by means of interest rate policies, taking into account the 
short- and medium-run real effects, as well as more reasonable, that is higher, inflation 
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targets.21 The ‘parking-it’ position, however, refrains from recommending fine tuning the 
economy by means of interest rate policies, but focuses on the long-run distribution effects of 
the central bank setting the interest rate, which we have highlighted above, and recommends 
to stabilise the long-term rate of interest at a certain level. Different targets have been 
proposed. Smithin (2004), for example, suggests that the real interest rate should be set to 
zero, or as close to zero as possible, allowing rentiers to maintain their stock of real wealth but 
not to participate in real growth. Lavoie (1996a) and Setterfield (2006b) are in favour of 
setting the real rate of interest equal to productivity growth, which allows rentiers to 
participate in real growth and keeps distribution between rentiers, on the one hand, and firms 
and labourers, on the other hand, constant (Pasinetti’s (1981) ‘fair rate of interest’).22 Since 
we have abstracted from productivity growth in our model, these two rules are essentially the 
same. Therefore, we obtain the following monetary policy rule: 
 
(36) , uee0n pˆpˆii ++=
 
with  being given by medium-run productivity growth. Central banks will have to adjust 
their policy instrument, the nominal interest rate, so that a constant expected real rate of 
interest equal to medium-run productivity growth emerges. This implies adjusting the nominal 
interest rate to unexpected inflation at the end of each period. 
e
0i
 
Note that monetary policies in this approach should neither pursue an inflation target nor 
make any attempts at adjusting the employment rate to some target. Of course, monetary 
policies remain responsible for the orderly working of the monetary and financial system, the 
                                                 
21 Taking price stability as the monetary policy goal, Fontana/Palacio-Vera (2006, 2007) recommend a ‘flexible’ 
or ‘asymmetrical opportunistic approach’ for monetary policy in order to avoid policy induced recessions and 
negative long-run effects on potential output. If inflation is at or below target, monetary policies should lower 
real interest rate in order to exploit the flat region of the Phillips curve and to improve potential output by means 
of stimulating investment and so on. If inflation is above target but below the upper limit tolerated by the central 
bank, real interest rates should be maintained constant. And only if inflation exceeds the upper limit, real interest 
rates should be raised. Assuming a backward bending Phillips curve, because workers are assumed to accept 
inflation induced real wage cuts in order to increase employment when inflation is low, Palley (2006) advocates 
that the central bank should target a ‘Minimum Unemployment Rate of Inflation’ (MURI). This model neglects 
conflict inflation and considers inflation to be an adjustment mechanism (grease). Although inflation targeting is 
seen to be consistent with PK monetary economics, it is considered to be insufficient because of its inability to 
deal with balance sheet disorders in the private sector (asset price bubbles) and its potentially dangerous 
implications for the real economy (increasing financial fragility, debt deflation). For this purpose Palley 
recommends the introduction of ‘asset-based reserve requirements’ as a monetary policy tool. 
22 Wray (2007) proposes a zero nominal interest rate in order to get rid of the rentiers’ class. However, this seems 
to imply overcoming the main characteristics of a monetary production economy, the advancement of credit in 
order to get production started. Obviously, with a zero nominal interest rate in a single interest rate model there 
is no incentive for banks/rentiers to grant credit for initial finance of production or final finance of the capital 
stock. 
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definition of credit standards for refinance operations with commercial banks (credit 
controls), the implementation of compulsory minimum reserves of different types to be held 
with the central bank, the role of a ‘lender of last resort’ in the case of systemic crises, and so 
on.23 
 
5.2 Wage policy 
 
The NCM view on the role of wage formation and wage bargaining, demanding nominal and 
real wage flexibility by means of structural reforms in the labour market and decentralisation 
of wage bargaining in order to accelerate the adjustment towards the NAIRU and in order to 
reduce the NAIRU itself cannot be sustained on the basis of our model. Nominal wage 
flexibility generates unexpected inflation whenever unemployment deviates from the NAIRU. 
This affects distribution between firms and rentiers, on the one hand, and distribution between 
capital and labour, on the other hand, and is hence associated with real wage flexibility. With 
realistic parameters, nominal wage flexibility makes actual unemployment diverge further 
from the NAIRU in our model, as we have shown above.24 
 
In order to avoid the destabilising effects of nominal and real wage flexibility, PKs advocate 
rigid nominal wages and hence allocate the role of nominal stabilisation to incomes or wage 
policies.25 Therefore, nominal unit labour costs should grow at a rate similar to the country’s 
inflation target, which means that nominal wage growth should equal the sum of medium-run 
growth of labour productivity (  ) and the target inflation rate: 0wˆ
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Following this wage formula will also keep income shares constant, provided that the mark-
up in firms’ pricing remains constant and that imported material costs in an open economy 
grow in line with domestic unit labour costs (Kalecki 1954: 28-30). Under these conditions, 
                                                 
23 This view is shared by the PK proponents of the ‘activist’ position (see for example Palley 2006) and of the 
‘parking-it’ position (see for instance Lavoie 1996a). A detailed discussion of central bank reactions towards 
financial market instabilities is outside the scope of the present contribution. 
24 Finally, wage moderation and redistribution at the expense of labour will not only negatively affect effective 
demand and employment in the short run, as well as the inflation barrier in the long run through the channels 
mentioned above, it will also be associated with weak real wage induced productivity growth which will further 
add to the weakening of long-run growth. See Bhaduri (2006a, 2006b) on the theoretical arguments and 
Naastepad (2006) and Naastepad/Storm (2007) for empirical analysis. 
25 See, for example, Arestis (1996), Davidson (2006), and Setterfield (2006a). 
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the destabilising effects of real wage flexibility in wage-led economies will be avoided, too. 
Implementing this wage formula is tantamount to flattening the short- and the long-run 
Phillips curve and making it horizontal in the optimal case. 
 
In the context of our model we have two ways of integrating nominal stabilisation by means 
of incomes policies. The first way is to increase the values of h2 and W2 in the Phillips curve 
(equation 13). This implies making the Phillips curve flatter by means of reducing workers’ 
and firms’ inflation push in the face of unexpected inflation, which means increasing firms’ 
and workers’ willingness to accept deviations of actual distribution from their respective 
targets. The second way is to make the target wage shares of workers and firms compatible 
for a relevant range of employment rates. In the context of our model this requires to 
reformulate the workers target wage share from equation (10): 
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The stable inflation rate of employment and hence the NAIRU becomes a corridor and the 
Phillips curve from equation (13) becomes a horizontal line between eN1 and eN2 (see Figure 
11): 
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In the first way, maybe the more realistic way, variations in the employment rate will have an 
– albeit weak – effect on unexpected inflation. If the NAIRU itself is not a strong attractor, 
any deviation from the stable inflation rate of employment will hence trigger cumulative 
deviation tendencies and real stabilisation will be required. In the second way, the optimal 
way, variations in the employment rate between eN1 and eN2 do not trigger any unexpected 
inflation and hence no cumulative processes will set in. In this case, demand management is 
free to choose a high level of employment close to eN2 without violating stable inflation rates. 
PKs argue that in particular a high degree of wage bargaining coordination at the national 
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level, strong labour unions and employer organisations, and hence organised labour markets 
should be particularly suitable for pursuing this nominal stabilisation role of wage 
bargaining.26 
 
5.3 Fiscal policy 
 
Because of the problems associated with real and nominal stabilisation by means of monetary 
policies mentioned above, the complete neglect of discretionary fiscal policies in the NCM 
turns out to be a major problem (see in particular Arestis/Sawyer 2003, 2004a, 2004c).27 
Therefore, PKs have argued in favour of real stabilisation by means of fiscal policies. This has 
again two dimensions: Since an adjustment of actual unemployment to a NAIRU cannot 
generally be expected, neither from market forces nor from monetary policies, fiscal policies 
are required for short-run real stabilisation. And since the NAIRU is endogenous to actual 
unemployment and hence to effective demand in the medium to long run, fiscal policies do 
not only have short-run real effects but also affect long-run development of the economy 
through the endogeneity channels discussed above. Since fiscal policies are responsible for 
short- and medium- to long-run demand management, it goes without saying that fiscal 
policies also have to prevent persistent demand inflation, hence aggregate demand persistently 
exceeding productive capacities.28 
 
Arestis/Sawyer (2003) demonstrate that the major arguments put forward against a use of 
discretionary fiscal policies, ‘crowding out’ (through higher inflation and associated real 
balance effects or higher real interest rates) and the ‘Ricardian equivalence theorem’,29 are 
unconvincing, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Both arguments have to assume that 
the economy operates at full employment equilibrium level. But if there is already full 
employment, there is no need to implement expansionary fiscal policies in order to achieve 
full employment and hence there is no need to worry about ‘crowding out’ or ‘Ricardian 
                                                 
26 See Hein (2006a, 2007: 133-152) and Kriesler/Lavoie (2007) for the implementation of coordinated wage 
bargaining into PK models and Hein (2002, 2004) for reviews of the related literature. 
27 For the inappropriateness of this view, also within a NCM framework, see Setterfield (2007), who shows that 
also within the NCM framework there is good reason to conclude that ‘… fiscal policy is at least as, if not, more 
potent as an instrument of stabilization policy than is monetary policy …’ (Setterfield 2007: 417, italics in the 
original). 
28 We therefore disagree with Lavoie (1996) who recommends that the central bank should apply credit rationing 
or credit controls in order to stop demand inflation. We hold that fiscal policies are far more straightforward in 
achieving this goal. 
29 For a discussion of further institutional aspects of fiscal policies that are said to produce ineffectiveness of 
fiscal policy, as model uncertainty, decision and implementation lags, deficit bias for political economy reasons, 
etc. see also Arestis/Sawyer (2003). 
 
 28
equivalence’! What might occur, in an economy governed by effective demand - with 
investment (and government deficit spending) causing saving (mainly through income effects) 
also in the long run - and characterised by endogenous money, is ‘crowding out’, but only if 
central banks deliberately raise interest rates in the face of expansive fiscal policies. And even 
in this case, crowding out might not materialise because the negative effects of rising interest 
rates on investment may be too small to overcompensate the positive effects of higher demand 
on investment decisions. However, rising interest rates will have distribution effects which 
may negatively feed back on economic development in the medium to long run, as argued 
above. Making use of government deficit spending for stabilising effective demand in the 
short and in the medium to long run, in the sense of ‘functional finance’, that is compensating 
private sector full (or stable inflation rate of) employment saving by government deficit 
spending,30 therefore requires that central banks do not interfere with expansionary fiscal 
policies and stick to a policy of low interest rates, as recommended above. 
 
In the context of our model real stabilisation should therefore be delegated to fiscal policies 
and equation (18) can be extended in the following way: 
 
(40) ( ) 10T10 d0,d0,eeddd <≤−+= , 
 
with d0 as permanent government deficit spending, which is required if employment is at 
target (eT), and d1 as the reaction in the case of deviations of employment from target. The 
employment target is, of course, the maximum employment rate achievable without triggering 
unexpected inflation. However, since high levels of demand and moderate unexpected 
inflation may have medium run expansionary effects on the stable inflation rate of 
employment through the endogeneity channels discussed above, fiscal policies should make 
sure to operate at the upper limit and should always ‘test the waters’. 
 
5.4 A Post-Keynesian policy-mix 
 
                                                 
30 The ‘functional finance’ view, pioneered by Lerner (1943), recommends government deficits, the difference 
between government spending (G) and taxes (T), to mop up the excess of private sector planned saving (S) over 
planned investment (I), plus the difference between imports (M) and exports (X), at a desired (full employment) 
level of economic activity: G-T = S-I+M-X (see Arestis/Sawyer 2004c). Applying government deficit spending 
in the ‘functional finance’ way assures that there is always enough saving to fund government deficits by means 
of issuing bonds and/or increasing the central bank’s money supply, buying government bonds through open 
market operations. Crowding out will not occur, provided that the central bank does not raise the interest rate. 
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We can now summarise the alternative PK assignment of macroeconomic policies for a closed 
economy. The coordination of monetary, fiscal and wage policies along these lines should be 
more conducive to reasonable growth, high employment, and stable inflation than the NCM 
economic policy approach. In this assignment or policy-mix, wage policies, and hence wage 
bargaining parties, are mainly responsible for stable inflation rates, and hence for nominal 
stabilisation. Fiscal policies are responsible for the management of demand, maintaining 
effective demand at high employment levels, and hence for real stabilisation in the short and 
in the long run. Monetary policies by the central bank should neither aim at fine tuning the 
economy in real nor in nominal terms, and should thus not interfere with the tasks of wage 
and fiscal policies, but should rather focus on stable distribution between rentiers, on the one 
hand, and firms and labourers, on the other hand, in order to avoid destabilising distribution 
effects of changes in the interest rate. 
 
< Figure 10: A ‘realistic’ Post-Keynesian policy mix > 
 
< Figure 11: An ‘optimal’ Post-Keynesian policy mix > 
 
Since we have distinguished two ways of integrating nominally stabilising wage policies into 
our model, we have two graphical representations of the PK policy-mix. In Figure 10 we have 
a ‘realistic’ PK policy mix with a flat but not horizontal Phillips curve. This policy mix 
requires fiscal stabilisation around the unique NAIRU and hence a very activist fiscal policy. 
In Figure 11 the ‘optimal’ PK policy-mix is shown with a horizontal Phillips curve in which 
the employment rate is more robust with respect to external shocks and hence less activist 
fiscal policies are required. It should be noted that in both representations an increasing stable 
inflation rate of employment can be supposed if actual employment remains at a high level, 
through the endogeneity channels discussed above, in particular through persistence 
mechanisms in the labour market and the effects of high investment on the capital stock. 
 
Extending the Post-Keynesian macroeconomic policy-mix proposed here to the open 
economy is a difficult task due to the unclear determination of the nominal exchange rate, on 
the one hand, and potential interference with domestic goals, on the other hand. 
Arestis/Sawyer (2006) argue that monetary policies should be responsible for the exchange 
rate in a floating exchange rate system. This requires the exchange rate to be mainly affected 
by interest rate differentials. However, if there are further determinants of the nominal 
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exchange rate, inflation differentials or (expected) growth differentials, such an assignment 
could be misleading. In this case, all three policy actors would affect the exchange rate. 
However, this is only a preliminary conclusion and further research is required to clarify this 
issue. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have developed a model which synthesises several of the PK criticisms of the 
NCM. Based on this model we have developed a PK alternative macroeconomic policy mix to 
the one proposed by the NCM. Our model consists of three classes, rentiers, firms and 
workers, and it has a short-run inflation barrier derived from distribution conflict between 
these classes which, however, becomes endogenous in the medium run. Distribution conflict 
does not only affect inflation but also income shares and hence effective demand and 
employment. We have shown that in the short run the stable inflation rate of employment, and 
hence the NAIRU, may be an attractor of actual unemployment determined by effective 
demand, but only under very special conditions. If these conditions are not met, inflation 
targeting monetary policies, as proposed by the NCM, may under certain conditions be able to 
adjust the economy to the stable inflation equilibrium in the short run, but we have argued that 
these adjustment capacities may be asymmetric. Under certain conditions inflation targeting 
monetary policies may be even counterproductive. 
 
Discussing medium-run endogeneity channels of the NAIRU, we have shown that even if 
monetary policies varying the nominal interest rate are successful in stabilising inflation in the 
short run, the medium-run cost effects associated with changes in the ‘ex ante’ real rate of 
interest may generate the inflation problem again. We have also integrated further 
endogeneity channels into our model which adjust the stable inflation rate of employment 
towards actual employment determined by the goods market, and hence the NAIRU towards 
actual unemployment: persistence mechanisms in the labour market, adaptive wage and profit 
aspirations, and investment in capital stock.  
 
Based on these results we have finally argued that the NCM macroeconomic policy 
assignment should be replaced by a PK assignment. Enhancing employment without 
increasing inflation in a closed economy is possible if macroeconomic policies are 
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coordinated along the following lines: The central bank targets distribution between rentiers, 
on the hand, and firms and labourers, on the other hand, and sets low real interest rates, wage 
bargaining parties target inflation, and fiscal policies are applied for short- and medium-run 
real stabilisation purposes. The extension of this Post-Keynesian economic policy assignment 
to an open economy remains to be developed. 
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Figure 1: Conflicting claims, inflation and distribution 
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Figure 2: The NAIRU as a non-attractor: monotonic divergence 
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Figure 3: The NAIRU as a non-attractor: oscillating divergence 
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Figure 3: The NAIRU as an attractor 
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Figure 5: An inflation targeting central bank stabilising the NAIRU 
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Figure 6: Labour market persistence mechanisms and the NAIRU 
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Figure 7: Endogenous wage and profit aspirations and the NAIRU 
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Figure 8: Low investment, slow capital stock growth and the NAIRU 
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Figure 9: Persistent change in the ‘ex ante’ real rate of interest and the NAIRU 
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Figure 10: A ‘realistic’ Post-Keynesian policy mix 
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Figure 11: An ‘optimal’ Post-Keynesian policy mix 
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